Health Regions
What If State Boundaries Are the Wrong Map?
The opioid crisis in Mingo County, West Virginia and Pike County, Kentucky is the same crisis. The coal companies that employed both counties operated across the state line without regard for it. The pharmaceutical representatives who marketed OxyContin to pain clinics in the Tug Fork Valley visited both states on the same trip. The addiction that followed did not stop at the Big Sandy River. The overdose deaths that resulted are counted separately by two state health departments, addressed by two RHTP applications, and funded through two federal allocations with no coordination requirement.
A physician practicing in Williamson, West Virginia cannot prescribe medication-assisted treatment for a patient living seven miles away in Pikeville, Kentucky without a separate state license. A community health worker trained in Kentucky cannot cross the bridge to work in West Virginia. A telehealth platform built by West Virginia’s RHTP cannot serve Pike County patients. The crisis is one. The response is two.
This is not a story about the Tug Fork Valley. It is the story of rural health governance in America. Series 10 examined eighteen distinct regions and found the same structural finding in nearly every one: health need, health infrastructure, and health culture organize by geography, not by the lines state legislatures drew. The synthesis concluded that state administration does not fit regional reality. This companion makes the explicit case that regional health governance, not better state coordination, is what the evidence demands.
Part I: What Eighteen Regions Prove#
The Geographic Evidence#
Series 10 documented regions whose health challenges are coherent within geographic boundaries and fragmented by political ones.
Appalachia spans thirteen states with a shared extraction history, shared disease burden, and shared workforce crisis. The Appalachian Regional Commission demonstrates that regional governance is politically achievable. ARC’s limitation, its lack of health authority, demonstrates that existing regional governance was not designed for healthcare. Thirteen separate RHTP applications address the same region without coordination.
The Mississippi Delta spans three states with mortality rates approaching those of developing nations. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana each address Delta health through separate state strategies. Maternal mortality in the Delta is a regional crisis receiving three fragmented responses. The Delta Regional Authority exists but has even less health engagement than ARC.
The Black Belt crosses eight states with health outcomes tracing directly to 400 years of extraction. The region is invisible in most state RHTP applications because it constitutes a minority of any single state’s geography. Alabama’s application treats Black Belt counties the same as its Gulf Coast. Georgia’s application does not distinguish the Black Belt from metropolitan Atlanta’s exurbs.
The Great Plains stretch across ten states experiencing depopulation so severe that some counties have fewer residents than they did in 1890. Healthcare investment in communities with declining population requires coordination that ten separate state strategies cannot provide. No governance mechanism exists for asking whether the Great Plains need a regional health strategy rather than ten state strategies addressing the same depopulation with different bureaucracies.
Tribal lands cross thirty-six states with federal trust relationships that state administration cannot appropriately mediate. The Navajo Nation spans Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Standing Rock spans North and South Dakota. RHTP flowing through states to sovereign nations represents what the synthesis correctly identified as a category error that better implementation cannot correct.
The Texas-Mexico border constitutes a binational health region where communicable disease, environmental health, and healthcare utilization patterns cross an international boundary. State-administered RHTP for a region whose health reality is international mismatches governance to geography at the most fundamental level.
The Quantitative Pattern#
The synthesis matrix rated state administration fit across eighteen regions. The results are unambiguous:
Poor fit: 8 of 18 regions. Appalachia, Ozarks, Black Belt, Mississippi Delta, Piney Woods, Great Plains, Texas-Mexico Border, Tribal Lands. These regions either span multiple states without coordination mechanisms or involve sovereignty relationships that state administration cannot mediate.
Moderate fit: 7 of 18 regions. High Plains, Upland South, Intermountain West, Rocky Mountain West, Upper Midwest, Pacific Northwest Timber, Pacific Interior. These regions could be addressed through sub-state targeting within state strategies, but whether states actually target them varies. Some do. Many do not.
Good fit: 3 of 18 regions. Northern New England, Florida Rural, Alaska. These regions benefit from small-state coordination capacity, single-state containment, or progressive political context. Even these regions face challenges that state administration addresses imperfectly.
The majority of American rural health regions are poorly served by state-based administration. This is not an implementation failure. It is an architectural mismatch between how health organizes and how governance operates.
What the Regions Share#
Across eighteen articles, five characteristics defined regions as health governance units:
Shared ecology. Topography, climate, water systems, and land use patterns create health environments that state lines ignore. Appalachian hollows, Great Plains wind exposure, Delta floodplains, and borderland aridity produce health conditions specific to geography, not jurisdiction.
Shared economic history. Extraction economies (coal, timber, cotton, cattle) organized regions around resource exploitation that shaped population patterns, community structures, and health infrastructure. The economic transition from extraction to whatever follows is a regional phenomenon requiring regional response.
Shared disease burden. Mortality corridors, chronic disease concentrations, and behavioral health crises follow geographic rather than jurisdictional patterns. Central Appalachian opioid mortality, Delta maternal mortality, Great Plains suicide rates, and Black Belt cardiovascular disease all organize regionally.
Shared workforce markets. Health professionals practice within labor markets defined by geography and transportation, not state lines. The Tug Fork Valley physician market is one market artificially divided by licensure requirements. Regional workforce planning could address what thirteen separate state workforce strategies cannot.
Shared cultural identity. Communities within regions recognize themselves as belonging to a place defined by geography and history, not by state affiliation. Appalachian identity, Delta identity, Great Plains identity: these are stronger organizing forces for many residents than state citizenship. Health programs that align with how people understand their place can build engagement that state-administered programs cannot.
Part II: The Case for Regional Health Governance#
What Regional Governance Means#
Regional health governance is the authority to plan, fund, and deliver healthcare across a defined geographic area regardless of state boundaries. It does not replace state government. It supplements state authority for health functions that state boundaries fragment.
Regional governance is not a novel concept in American federalism. The Tennessee Valley Authority has governed water, power, and economic development across seven states since 1933. The Appalachian Regional Commission has coordinated economic development across thirteen states since 1965. Interstate compacts govern water rights, transportation, and environmental management across virtually every state boundary in the nation. The principle that some problems require governance matching their geography has been accepted for nearly a century.
Healthcare is the conspicuous exception. Despite evidence that health outcomes organize regionally, health governance remains exclusively state-based (with federal overlay). No regional health authority exists anywhere in the United States. No interstate health compact governs health delivery. No mechanism allows RHTP or any other federal health program to fund regional rather than state-based implementation.
Three Models#
Regional health governance could take multiple forms. None requires eliminating state authority. All require supplementing it.
Model 1: Regional Health Authorities
Formal governmental entities with health planning, funding, and regulatory authority across defined geographic regions. Modeled on ARC’s structure (federal-state partnership with dedicated funding) but with explicit health authority that ARC lacks.
How it would work. Congress authorizes regional health authorities for designated multi-state health regions. Authorities receive direct federal health funding alongside (not replacing) state RHTP allocations. Authorities coordinate regional workforce planning, shared technology platforms, cross-boundary provider networks, and population health strategy. Governance includes federal, state, and community representation. Tribal nations participate as sovereign partners, not as demographic groups within state strategies.
Precedent. ARC, Delta Regional Authority, Denali Commission (Alaska). All demonstrate federal-state-regional partnership governance. None has health authority. Extension to health represents logical expansion of existing models.
Advantages. Permanent institutional structure. Dedicated funding stream. Regional planning capacity. Cross-boundary authority for licensure, credentialing, and network development.
Challenges. Requires congressional authorization. States may resist authority transfer. Political feasibility uncertain. Long development timeline.
Model 2: Interstate Health Compacts
Voluntary agreements between states sharing health regions, establishing common standards, mutual recognition, and coordinated planning for cross-boundary health challenges.
How it would work. States sharing regions (e.g., Kentucky and West Virginia for Central Appalachia, Arkansas and Mississippi and Louisiana for the Delta) negotiate compacts establishing mutual license recognition for health professionals, shared telehealth platforms, coordinated workforce recruitment, and aligned RHTP implementation for border areas. Compacts operate under existing interstate compact authority requiring congressional consent.
Precedent. Interstate Medical Licensure Compact (already operational in 40+ states). Nurse Licensure Compact (already operational in 40+ states). Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact. Emergency Management Assistance Compact. These demonstrate that interstate health cooperation is legally feasible and operationally functional.
Advantages. Builds on existing compact infrastructure. Does not require new federal legislation. Voluntary participation increases political feasibility. Incremental expansion possible.
Challenges. Voluntary participation means reluctant states can decline. Compacts address specific functions rather than comprehensive governance. Coordination without authority produces coordination theater (as Series 5 documented for state agencies).
Model 3: Federal Regional Demonstration Authority
CMS creates administrative authority to fund regional health demonstrations that test cross-boundary health governance within RHTP’s existing authorization.
How it would work. CMS designates multi-state health demonstration zones aligned with recognized regions (Central Appalachia, Mississippi Delta, Great Plains tribal regions). Demonstration authority allows pooling RHTP funds across state allocations for regional implementation. Regional governance boards including state, community, provider, and tribal representation manage demonstration programs. Evaluation determines whether regional governance produces better outcomes than state-based administration.
Precedent. CMS Innovation Center demonstrations. Accountable Health Communities Model. State Innovation Models. These demonstrate CMS authority to test governance innovations within existing programs.
Advantages. Does not require congressional action. Can be implemented within existing RHTP authorization. Demonstration framework allows evaluation before permanent adoption. Regional focus concentrates innovation where governance mismatch is greatest.
Challenges. Administrative complexity. State resistance to pooled funding. Limited scope without legislative authority. Demonstration timelines may not align with RHTP implementation.
Part III: What Regional Governance Enables#
Problem 1: The Workforce That States Cannot Share#
The physician practicing in Williamson, West Virginia cannot treat patients in Pike County, Kentucky seven miles away. State licensure creates artificial barriers within unified labor markets. The barrier is not clinical; it is jurisdictional. The physician’s competence does not change at the state line.
Regional governance enables unified workforce markets. Regional health authorities or interstate compacts could establish regional licensure for health professionals practicing within designated health regions. A nurse practitioner licensed in the Central Appalachian Health Region could practice across Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, and Ohio counties within ARC’s distressed designation. This is not hypothetical. The Interstate Medical Licensure Compact already demonstrates the mechanism. Extension to regional health practice zones requires political will, not legal innovation.
Regional workforce planning replaces competitive recruitment. Currently, thirteen Appalachian states compete for the same inadequate physician supply. Each state’s RHTP application proposes recruitment strategies that, if successful, would deprive neighboring states of providers. Regional workforce planning would assess regional need, coordinate training pipeline investment, and allocate providers across the region rather than enabling states to poach from each other.
Problem 2: The Technology That States Cannot Connect#
West Virginia’s RHTP builds a telehealth platform. Kentucky’s RHTP builds a different telehealth platform. Neither serves patients across the state line. Neither connects to the other’s health information exchange. The region has two incompatible technology systems serving one population.
Regional governance enables shared technology infrastructure. A regional health information exchange serving Central Appalachia would allow providers on both sides of the state line to access patient records, coordinate care, and share diagnostic resources. A regional telehealth platform would enable the specialist in Lexington to serve patients in both Kentucky and West Virginia counties without separate platform integration.
Regional data systems enable regional population health. State-based health data systems produce state-level analysis that obscures regional patterns. Appalachian opioid mortality data disaggregated by thirteen states masks the regional pattern visible only in aggregation. Regional health data systems would enable the population health analysis that regional challenges require.
Problem 3: The Networks That States Cannot Build#
Hub-and-spoke healthcare networks organize around referral patterns, specialty access, and transport corridors that follow geography rather than jurisdiction. The hospital network serving Central Appalachia’s patients routes through Lexington, Charleston, and Knoxville, three hubs in three states. No state’s RHTP can build a network spanning all three.
Regional governance enables geography-based networks. Regional health authorities could designate regional hub facilities, establish referral protocols spanning state lines, and invest in transport corridors connecting spoke communities to regional hubs regardless of state boundary. A patient in McDowell County, West Virginia should access the closest appropriate facility whether it is in Virginia, Kentucky, or West Virginia. Currently, state-administered programs incentivize in-state referral even when out-of-state facilities are closer, better equipped, and more appropriate.
Problem 4: The Sovereignty That States Cannot Mediate#
Tribal health governance requires government-to-government relationships between sovereign nations and the federal government. State administration of RHTP for tribal populations inserts state government between two sovereigns, creating a mediation role that neither sovereign requested and neither benefits from.
Regional governance for tribal health means tribal governance. The most important regional health governance innovation for tribal populations is not interstate coordination but direct federal-tribal health authority bypassing state mediation entirely. Series 14G (Tribal Demonstration) explores this in depth. The regional governance argument supports it by demonstrating that geographic health challenges require governance matching their geography, and tribal health challenges require governance matching their sovereignty.
Part IV: Political Economy#
Who Gains#
Rural communities in multi-state regions. The primary beneficiaries of regional health governance are communities currently fragmented by state boundaries. Central Appalachian communities gain coordinated workforce, technology, and network development. Delta communities gain unified response to their unified crisis. Great Plains communities gain regional planning for regional depopulation. Tribal nations gain governance respecting sovereignty.
Federal programs. Regional governance reduces duplication, enables evaluation at appropriate geographic scale, and concentrates resources where governance mismatch currently wastes them. Thirteen separate Appalachian workforce strategies cost more and produce less than one regional strategy would.
Regional institutions. ARC, DRA, and similar bodies gain health authority that their mandates logically encompass but currently exclude. Health authority strengthens these institutions and extends their relevance.
Who Loses#
State agencies. Regional governance transfers some health authority from state to regional level. State agencies that currently control RHTP implementation would share authority with regional entities. This loss is real and explains state resistance to regional governance.
State politicians. Healthcare delivery is a significant component of state political economy. Governors, legislators, and state health officials derive political benefit from controlling health funding and directing health investments. Regional governance reduces this control. The political cost of supporting regional governance is tangible; the political benefit accrues to communities rather than officials.
Existing intermediaries. State hospital associations, primary care associations, and other intermediaries organized at state level would face competition from regional entities. Organizations whose relevance depends on state-level governance resist governance changes that reduce their role.
Why Resistance Persists#
The political economy of regional health governance explains why it does not exist despite evidence supporting it. The beneficiaries are diffuse (communities across multiple states) while the opponents are concentrated (state agencies, state politicians, state-level intermediaries). Concentrated opposition typically defeats diffuse benefit in American politics.
Overcoming this dynamic requires either crisis sufficient to override institutional resistance or federal action imposing regional governance despite state opposition. The converging policy earthquake documented in Series 12 may produce the crisis. Federal demonstration authority may provide the mechanism. Neither is guaranteed.
The honest assessment is that regional health governance is analytically obvious and politically difficult. This companion makes the analytical case. Whether the political system responds to analysis or requires the accumulation of avoidable suffering before acting is a question this document cannot answer but that the evidence makes urgent.
Part V: What Can Happen Now#
Regional health governance in its most ambitious form requires legislative action unlikely in the current political environment. But incrementalsteps are available now.
Expand existing licensure compacts to cover RHTP implementation. The Interstate Medical Licensure Compact and Nurse Licensure Compact already enable cross-boundary practice. States implementing RHTP could explicitly designate border areas for compact-based practice, enabling providers to serve cross-boundary patient populations.
Establish regional health data sharing. States sharing regions could agree to share health data for regional population health analysis without requiring formal governance structures. Research partnerships between state health departments and regional institutions (ARC, DRA) could produce the regional health data systems that regional governance would formalize.
Create voluntary coordination mechanisms for cross-boundary RHTP implementation. CMS could incentivize (not require) states sharing regions to coordinate RHTP implementation for border areas. Joint workforce planning, shared technology specifications, and aligned performance metrics for cross-boundary regions represent coordination achievable without governance reform.
Fund ARC and DRA health capacity. Congressional appropriation expanding ARC and DRA mandates to include health planning, assessment, and coordination would build institutional capacity for regional health governance without requiring new institutional creation. These institutions already have regional legitimacy, federal partnership, and state relationships. Adding health authority to existing mandates is simpler than creating new regional health authorities.
Authorize tribal health demonstration. Federal authority for direct tribal RHTP participation, bypassing state mediation, addresses the sovereignty mismatch that regional governance frameworks alone cannot resolve. This is the most urgent regional governance reform because the governance error is categorical rather than incremental.
Conclusion#
Eighteen regional articles produced one finding: health organizes by geography, and governance organizes by jurisdiction, and the mismatch between them produces fragmented response to coherent challenges. This is not a new finding. It has been known for decades. The Appalachian Regional Commission was created in 1965 partly in recognition of it. Sixty years later, the recognition has not extended to health governance.
The evidence from Series 10 does not permit ambiguity. State administration of multi-state health regions produces demonstrably inadequate response. Communities on state borders receive fragmented care from programs that do not communicate. Workforce markets artificially divided by licensure lose providers to competition between jurisdictions addressing the same shortage. Technology systems built in parallel rather than shared waste resources that constrained communities cannot afford to waste. Sovereign nations receive state-mediated federal programs that respect neither their sovereignty nor their health needs.
Regional health governance is the solution that evidence supports. Not the only solution, not a sufficient solution, but the governance reform without which optimization within state-based systems reaches a ceiling defined by jurisdictional mismatch rather than by policy quality or implementation competence.
The physician in Williamson can see Pike County from his office window. His patients live on both sides of the river. The crisis that brought them to his practice does not respect the state line visible from his examining room. Neither should the governance that addresses their health.
How this article connects to others in Blue Gray Matters.
Sources cited in this article.
- Appalachian Regional Commission. "Health Disparities in Appalachia." ARC, August 2017.
- Appalachian Regional Commission. "Appalachian Diseases of Despair: Update 2025." ARC, July 2025.
- Congressional Research Service. "The Appalachian Regional Commission: An Overview." CRS, February 2024.
- Delta Regional Authority. "State of the Delta Report 2025." DRA, 2025.
- Federation of State Medical Boards. "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact." ICLC, 2025.
- Flowers, Catherine Coleman. *Waste: One Woman's Fight Against America's Dirty Secret*. The New Press, 2020.
- Indian Health Service. "IHS Profile." IHS, 2025.
- Kaiser Family Foundation. "Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions." KFF, 2025.
- National Academy for State Health Policy. "State Telehealth Policies." NASHP, 2025.
- National Council of State Legislatures. "Interstate Compacts." NCSL, 2025.
- Popper, Deborah E., and Frank J. Popper. "The Great Plains: From Dust to Dust." *Planning*, December 1987.
- Rural Health Information Hub. "Rural Health Disparities Overview." RHIhub, 2025.
- Tribal Self-Governance Advisory Committee. "Annual Report to Congress." TSGAC, 2024.
- Zimmerman, Joseph F. *Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative Agreements*. Praeger, 2nd ed., 2012.